Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God is a great book. It basically argues that arguments for skepticism regarding God work equally well against the existence of other minds, or against the objectivity of the “external” world.

But even though it is a good book, I’m thinking right now that the comparison itself brings with it a warning against philosophical apologetics. The reason I see a warning is because I belive the following:

When embroiled in “philosophical” discussion, it becomes all too easy to actually create real doubts about our knowledge of the reality of other minds or of the “external” world.

Now, if you disagree with that statement, then never mind anything I’m about to say. But that is what I think. While Thomas Reid was quite astute in observing that philophical arguments against skepticism are never more powerful than one’s previous confidence in one’s “common sense” notion that there are indeed other minds and/or an external world, in philosophical classrooms, this all recedes. The very discussion promotes skepticism in the participants.

So, frankly, while Plantinga’s argument is excellent, it also serves to explain why atheologians might be more credible than one would expect. The very nature of the discussion promotes skepticism. No one normally doubts the reality of other minds or that the chair in a room is still there when they leave it, or that a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it makes a disturbance in the air. But, in philosophical discussion, this is all up for grabs.

Which brings me to another point. Imagine that I tell you I am married to my wife and you refuse to believe me because you believe that females are mythological constructs invented to satisfy certain psychological needs. So we get into a philosphical argument about whether the idea of “females” is ultimately an illusion. But winning that argument is not really proof that my wife exists, nor does it involve any of the real reasons I believe that she exists or trust her as my beloved. No, those reasons are all historical. I met Jennifer. We interacted. We got married on a certain day at a certain time.

And what about “God”? Are we arguing for the existence of a classification that could, in theory, include Zeus, Allah, as well as YHWH? Or are we arguing for a specific person or persons–Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? Is this god known primarily by philosophical necessity or has he met us quite powerfully in history? Is arguing for the existence of God ever really supposed to resemble arguing for the existence of other minds?

I had read a boatload of Van Til, but nothing entranced me with apologetics (and theology) like N. T. Wright. And I think this is the reason why. We are arguing, from beginning to end, about someone who met us in Bethlehem, Calvary, and the Mount of Olives, not about whether or not space is an illusion.