Gary North wants to make a decisive distinction between God’s “favor” and “favors”-only allowing the latter to the reprobate. Hoeksema maintains the same sort of division. In his self-interrogating catechism he writes:

9. Is it then, not also true, that in these things of this present life both the godly and ungodly receive tokens of God’s favor toward them?

By no means; for, as it must be evident both from Scripture and experience that the evil things of this present life, such as sickness, pain, sorrow, adversity, poverty, yea, even death, are not sent to the godly in God’s wrath and to curse them; so it must be evident that the good things of this present life; are not sent to the wicked in God’s favor and to bless them. We must not confuse grace and things.

10. In what light, then, must we consider the things which in this life the godly and ungodly have in common, in order correctly to evaluate them and understand their significance?

In the light of eternity. All the things of the present life are but means to an eternal end. As they are received by us and employed by us as rational-moral creatures they all bear fruit, either to eternal life and glory, or to eternal death and desolation. If they tend to life they are bestowed on us in the grace of God and are a blessing, no matter whether they are in health or sickness, prosperity or adversity, life or death, for all things work together for good to them that love God; if they tend to death and damnation they are bestowed on us in God’s wrath and are a curse, even though our eyes stand out with fatness and we bathe in luxury. [Protestant Reformed Churches in America, pp. 313-314.]

Murray simply does not accept this sort of reasoning. He makes a distinction, using traditional dogmatic terminology between different sorts of ways in which God wills:

It is not to be forgotten that when it is said that God absolutely and universally takes no pleasure in the death of the wicked, we are not here speaking of God’s decretive will. In terms of his decretive will it must be said that God absolutely decrees the eternal death of some wicked and, in that sense, is absolutely pleased so to decree. But in the text it is the will of God’s benevolence (voluntas eurastias) that is stated, not the will of God’s decree (voluntas eudokias). It is, in our judgment, quite unjustifiable to think that in this passage there is any reflection upon the decretive will of God . . . [Collected Writings, p. 125-126.]

Thus, it is simply wrong to insist that the end to which a thing (sunshine, rain, a presentation of the Gospel, etc.) will lead according to God’s immutable and infallible plan is the only consideration one should weigh in deciding whether it is a “favor” or represent’s God’s attitude of “favor.”

(Gary North’s distinction between a God giving reprobates “favors” instead of having an attitude of “favor” toward them seems unjustifiable. An argument that God has no attitude of “favor” toward the reprobate would also seem to prove that He gives them no favors but only snares to trap them in their ingratitude. The term “favor” as applied to things is just as much dependent on the attitude of the one giving them as it is when used to describe the attitude itself.)
To use different terminology, Murray is rejecting an exclusively teleological approach to understanding God’s actions. Is this rejection warranted?

Yes, because an exclusively teleological approach would lead one to accuse God of hating His creatures without cause. This is the case because reprobation has occurred apart from depravity on the part of those who were reprobate. For instance, when the Devil and his angels first fell, they fell from grace. Their punishment was and will be determined in part by how much they had received from God, for which they were not properly grateful. Furthermore, God gave many favors to Adam and Eve–for all of which they were held accountable. Every good and perfect gift which God gave to Adam and Eve only added to the perversity of their sin. Unless one denies that, “from everyone who has been given much shall much be required,” is a universal principle, one simply cannot deny that all the favors shown to Satan, Adam, and Eve simply magnified the seriousness of their sin and the severity of their condemnation.

But does this fact mean that God did not love Adam and Eve? Were Adam and Eve, knowing that it was possible that they might Fall, supposed to infer that God might not love them? Were they supposed to wonder about all the good things they had been given by God–to worry that maybe God was “setting them up”? To ask such questions is to answer them. God unambiguously revealed His love for Adam and Eve in all the blessings which He lavished upon them. To claim otherwise is to take sides with the Serpent who ascribed horrible and underhanded motives to God.

Of course, it is hard to understand how God could love a creature and predestine his sin. But this is simply a problem that theists are going to have to live with. For an attempt to get a handle on the postlapsarian aspect to this problem, see Piper’s discussion of “The Infinitely Complex Emotional Life of God” (The Pleasures of God: Meditations on God’s Delight in Being God [Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1991],p. 66). He asks if it is any more problematic to speak of God both loving and hating the wicked than it is to consider God simultaneously grieving and rejoicing and empathizing in other ways with millions of Christians around the world.

Keep in mind that this is not an exclusively “calvinist” problem but one that besets any form of Christian classical theism. Anyone who admits that God knows the future, even if he rejects foreordination, is going to have problems understanding how God maintains a genuinely loving relationship with his ethical creatures. If God knows that John Smith will reject the Gospel, and yet brings it about that John Smith is offered the Gospel, isn’t God merely guilty of entrapment? Likewise, if God knows that every privilege and blessing He gives to Satan, Adam, and Eve will be eventually rejected and exacerbate their sin, then isn’t God enticing them into a greater rebellion? How can He possibly view His gifts to such creatures to be “good” for them when He knows evil will result?

It is hard to quite get one’s mind around this problem, but the answer has to be that God’s blessings are blessings apart from the ends to which they lead. Grace is grace, even if it leads to reprobation. God’s offer is sincere, and His mercy–even His non-saving mercy–is genuine. The Bible speaks both of sincere offers and certain reprobation. The Bible, it seems, does not deny the reality of teleology in God’s plan, but it does not allow teleology to exhaustively explain God’s feelings toward people, or our interpretation of his gracious acts of providence.

The texts Murray cites to prove that God sincerely desires the repentance of the reprobate are rather straightforward. Indeed, the issues are more or less settled by whether or not one acknowledges the reality of common grace. If God’s desires or pleasures can only be exhaustively identical to His decrees, then such statements as, “‘As I live!’ declares the Lord GOD, ‘I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways! Why then will you die, O house of Israel?’” (Eze 33.11; cf. 18.23, 32), can only be rationalized away for the sake of alleged theological consistency. Thus, John Gerstner insists that Murray (and Stonehouse) must be wrong:

We certainly agree that if God says that He desired what He did not desire we would have to agree with God. Since we know that God does not desire what God does not desire, for this is evident on every page of Scripture, as well as in the logical nature of God and man, we know this exegesis is in error, must be in error, cannot but be in error. . . But where is it’s error? It must be that Murray and Stonehouse are taking God literally where He desires to be taken anthropomorphically. . .[Wrongly Dividing the Word of Truth: A Critique of Dispensationalism (Brentwood, TN: Wolgemuth & Hyatt, 1991), p. 128.]

There are a couple things to say of Gerstner here: In the first place, it is rather hard to see any difference between saying that passages like Ezekiel 33.11 are meant “to be taken anthropomorphically” and saying that such passages are not true. What good is a verbal affirmation of Scriptural infallibility if any passage therein can be so easily done away with? Anthropomorphisms, whatever else one might say about them, are supposed to communicate truth; but Gerstner leaves this passage without admitting that it contains any message for us whatsoever. He only goes on for more than a page on how it does not mean, cannot mean, must not mean what it says.

(For a much better and more Scripture-honoring approach to the Ezekiel passages, see John Pipers discussion of “Does God Have Pleasure in the Death of the Wicked?” in The Pleasures of God: Meditations on God’s Delight in Being God (Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1991), p. 61ff. Especially helpful is his citation of Deuteronomy 28.63 (p. 65). Unlike Gerstner, Piper actually gives us Biblical reasons to nuance what we might think Ezekiel is telling us.)

Secondly, as we will see below, Murray does not present a contradiction. What Gerstner insists is a contradiction, Murray insists is not one. Thus, Gerstner is begging the question throughout his critique. He never argues that a contradiction exists but only quotes one portion of Murray’s essay which sets forth what appears to be contradictory. He then asserts that the apparent contradiction is real and concludes that Murray’s position must be wrong.

Other passages Murray cites are, in addition to passages used to prove common grace, Deuteronomy 5.29; 32.29; Psalm 81.13ff; Isaiah 48.18; Matthew 23.37; Luke 13.34; Isaiah 45.22; and 2 Peter 3.9. A detailed defense of these passages would be redundant, since all the counterarguments I can find involve heavy-handed special pleading which presupposes that passages teaching a genuine offer of the Gospel would contradict other passages. What is manifestly lacking, as in the case of Gerstner, is proof that such a formal contradiction is present between the doctrine of reprobation and the genuine offer. It is simply asserted.

(Indeed, Hoeksema, does not hesitate to accuse Murray, Van Til and others of being “purely Arminian. And their irrationalism is only an attempt to camouflage their real position” “The Text of the Complaint”-A Critique (no pub, n.d.), p. 26. [I believe this booklet of mimeographed sheets has been published by the Trinity Foundation as The Clark-Van Til Debate.] Observers of the current scene will be quite familiar with the strategy of compensating for inadequate argumentation by accusing one’s opponent of deceptions.)

I’m not home yet, but regarding my earlier post, I remembered that Hodge’s Systematic theology is available online.

With apologies to David, I’m not seeing the quotation the way he does:

The final test of any theory is its agreeing or disagreeing with the facts to be explained. The difficulty with all the Anti-Augustinian views as to the design of Christ’s death, is that while they are consistent with more or less of the Scriptural facts connected with the subject, they are utterly irreconcilable with others not less clearly revealed and equally important. They are consistent, for example, with the fact that the work of Christ lays the foundation for the offer of the gospel to all men, with the fact that men are justly condemned for the rejection of that offer; and with the fact that the Scriptures frequently assert that the work of Christ had reference to all men. All these facts can be accounted for on the assumption, that the great design of Christ’s death was to make the salvation of all men possible, and that it had equal reference to every member of our race. But there are other facts which this theory leaves out of view, and with which it cannot be reconciled.

As I see it, the statement in bold is a theory that Hodge claims does not account for all the facts revealed in Scripture. He agrees with the facts that the theory accounts for (“the fact that the work of Christ lays the foundation for the offer of the gospel to all men, with the fact that men are justly condemned for the rejection of that offer; and with the fact that the Scriptures frequently assert that the work of Christ had reference to all men”), but he thinks there are other facts.
In my opinion, David’s point is better substantiated from later in Hodge’s Systematic Theology

Admitting the satisfaction of Christ to be in itself of infinite value, how can it avail for the non-elect if it was not designed for them? It does not avail for the fallen angels, because it was not intended for them; how then can it avail for the non-elect, if not designed for them? How can a ransom, whatever its intrinsic value, benefit those for whom it was not paid? In this form the objection is far more specious. It is, however, fallacious. It overlooks the peculiar nature of the case. It ignores the fact that all mankind were placed under the same constitution or covenant. What was demanded for the salvation of one was demanded for the salvation of all. Every man is required to satisfy the demands of the law. No man is required to do either more or less. If those demands are satisfied by a representative or substitute, his work is equally available for all. The secret purpose of God in providing such a substitute for man, has nothing to do with the nature of his work, or with its appropriateness. The righteousness of Christ being of infinite value or merit, and being in its nature precisely what all men need, may be offered to all men. It is thus offered to the elect and to the non-elect; and it is offered to both classes conditionally. That condition is a cordial acceptance of it as the only ground of justification. If any of the elect (being adults) fail thus to accept of it, they perish. If any of the non-elect should believe, they would be saved. What more does any Anti-Augustinian scheme provide? The advocates of such schemes say, that the design of the work of Christ was to render the salvation of all men possible. All they can mean by this is, that if any man (elect or non-elect) believes, he shall, on the ground of what Christ has done, be certainly saved. But Augustinians say the same thing. Their doctrine provides for this universal offer of salvation, as well as any other scheme. It teaches that God in effecting the salvation of his own people, did whatever was necessary for the salvation of all men, and therefore to all the offer may be, and in fact is made in the gospel. If a ship containing the wife and children of a man standing on the shore is wrecked, he may seize a boat and hasten to their rescue. His motive is love to his family; his purpose is to save them. But the boat which he has provided may be large enough to receive the whole of the ship’s company. Would there be any inconsistency in his offering them the opportunity to escape? Or, would this offer prove that he had no special love to his own family and no special design to secure their safety. And if any or all of those to whom the offer was made, should refuse to accept it, some from one reason, some from another; some because they did not duly appreciate their danger; some because they thought they could save themselves; and some from enmity to the man from whom the offer came, their guilt and folly would be just as great as though the man had no special regard to his own family, and no special purpose to effect their deliverance. Or, if a man’s family were with others held in captivity, and from love to them and with the purpose of their redemption, a ransom should be offered sufficient for the delivery of the whole body of captives, it is plain that the offer of deliverance might be extended to all on the ground of that ransom, although specially intended only for a part of their number. Or, a man may make a feast for his own friends, and the provision be so abundant that he may throw open his doors to all who are willing to come. This is precisely what God, according to the Augustinian doctrine, has actually done. Out of special love to his people, and with the design of securing their salvation, He has sent his Son to do what justifies the offer of salvation to all who choose to accept of it. Christ, therefore, did not die equally for all men. He laid down his life for his sheep; He gave Himself for his Church. But in perfect consistency with all this, He did all that was necessary, so far as a satisfaction to justice is concerned, all that is required for 557the salvation of all men. So that all Augustinians can join with the Synod of Dort in saying, “No man perishes for want of an atonement.”

I can’t find that exact quotation in the translation of the Canons of Dordt, but I did find this:

However, that many who have been called through the gospel do not repent or believe in Christ but perish in unbelief is not because the sacrifice of Christ offered on the cross is deficient or insufficient, but because they themselves are at fault (art. 6, canon 2).

I have to say that I have been taught exactly the opposite in the name of “limited atonement” one of the five points based on the canons.

Charles Hodge:

All these facts can be accounted for on the assumption, that the great design of Christ’s death was to make the salvation of all men possible, and that it had equal reference to every member of our race.Systematic Theology, 2: 553.

[Lane brought up a possible problem with this quotation. I’m not at home so I can’t double-check the source. I’m more confident of other quotations in the blog entry linked below…]

[See above for my appraisal]

From here. David shares lots of challenging thoughts and I think any Calvinist will find the post worth reading. A couple of paragraphs from him:

If you want to agree with Warfield, then please be consistent, as consistent as Owen was, and own that is it stands, then, the expiation is not actually sufficient for any given reprobate man, and, further, that there is nothing you can offer him.

Any offer you can have to any man–given that you do not know who the elect and non-elect are, has to be a bare agnostic hypothesis, that were this given man to believe, it would turn out that there was an expiation for him too. But be honest, stating a conditional proposition is not an offer. One can state conditional propositions easily, but that’s not the same as offering a benefit.

If I remember right, because I agreed with Murray on the Free Offer of the Gospel, I dared to disagree with John Murray on the same issue for the same reason (and back when I went to seminary–back in the mid- to late 90s–disagreeing with Murray was hard to do; he hadn’t been declared an embarrassing constantly inebriated relative in the Reformed family yet. More like the godfather.). I’ll post about this when I have some time.

In my series on The “free” (i.e. genuine) offer of the Gospel, I pointed out in this post Berkhof’s reply to a hypercalvinist that Berkhof believes that the justified, can, in this life, also be in some sense under God’s wrath.  I wrote,

it is well worth asking how we are to interpret the destructive forces of nature, but such a question cannot reduce the plain meaning of Jesus’ words to absurdity, unless God can be guilty of absurdity, which is blasphemous to contemplate. Perhaps we need to ask if we have not created more trouble than necessary by absolutizing the distinction between God’s “Fatherly displeasure” and His “wrath,” between “discipline” and “chastisement” on the one hand, and “punishment” on the other. As Louis Berkhof asks rhetorically: “Are the elect in this life the objects of God’s love only, and never in any sense the objects of His wrath? Is Moses thinking of the reprobate when he says: ‘For we are consumed in thine anger, and in thy wrath we are troubled’? Psa 90.7.”[Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1941), p. 445.] It is a profound truth and great comfort that all things, including sufferings, work ultimately to our good as Christians. The question is whether that fact necessitates that all things are alike and in the same way to be considered “good” simply because of the future result in glory.

In context, Berkhof can only be talking about the elect after they are converted.  So, in reply to Hoeksema, Berkhof thought it was possible to look at the Bible and see that these justified people were also, in some sense, under God’s wrath.  Perhaps we should always use scare-quotes for “wrath,” in this case, like the actor I saw who re-enacted the Gospel of Luke (which was actually a pastiche that included John) and made quotation marks with his fingers while he played Jesus saying that his flesh was true “bread.”

But there are no scare quotes in Psalm 90.7.  And if it is possible for God to be angry and wrathful with the justified in some way, it seems equally plausible to say that unregenerate professing believers are, until they manifest their hard hearts in rebellion, in some sense relatively right with God compared to those who refuse to respond to the Gospel.

To understand Murray’s view of the Free Offer of the Gospel, it seems needful to give the issue some more elaboration. In Romans 1.18ff, the Apostle Paul sets forth the fundamental predicament of all men: All people everywhere are sinners against God. The primary message usually taken from this passage is that people are self-deceived because they suppress God’s revelation of Himself in nature and history by worshipping some aspect of creation. However, there is another aspect to Paul’s verdict on the Human race: “For even though they knew God they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks” (1.21a; emphasis added). All people everywhere have received good gifts from God, gifts for which they ought to be grateful. But they are not grateful for these gifts and are guilty of hard-hearted ingratitude.These good gifts which God gives in creation are not deserved on the part of man-not even Adam before the Fall could say he deserved the blessings which God had piled upon him (though at least he did not merit damnation). Furthermore, after the Fall, God continues to give good gifts to some degree or other even to hellworthy sinners. Whatever else they might be, these undeserved gifts cannot fail to be characterized as gracious. Along with general revelation, common grace is the basis for the condemnation of sinful man. Sinners are sinful because they are ingrates in the face of God’s love.

I think this obvious fact is sometimes missed because we tend to associate sin (rightfully, as far as it goes) not with grace but with Law. Thus, the Westminster Shorter Catechism defines sin as “any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the Law of God” (#14), citing 1 John 3.4. This is a good epistemological definition-in that it gives us a criterion for identifying sin. But it does not rule out the attempt to develop a more metaphysical definition, spelling out the essential nature of sin. For such a definition, ingratitude should be considered a candidate. This is not without Reformed pedigree. The Heidelberg Catechism defines the Law as the way by which we demonstrate our gratitude. Zacharias Ursinus, the Catechism’s principle author states, the Law is necessary so “that we may return such gratitude as is acceptable to God” (Commentary on the Catechism [Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, n.d., 1852], p. 22).

There is more to be said of God’s love and its relationship to reprobation, but the issue will be pursued after summarizing Murray’s basis for the genuine offer of the Gospel.

Distinctions Within Common Grace

Common grace, according to Murray, does not mean “that each particular favor is given to all without discrimination or distinction.” Rather it simply means the grace is held in common between the elect and the reprobate. It is manifest in “every favor of whatever kind or degree, falling short of salvation, which this undeserving and sin-cursed world enjoys at the hands of God.”

Citing Herman Kuiper’s work, Calvin on Common Grace (1928), Murray lists three classification of non-saving grace:

1. Universal Common Grace is God’s favor toward all creatures as creatures, despite the curse of sin.
2. General Common Grace is God’s favor toward all human beings as image-bearers of God, despite their sin.
3. Covenant Common Grace is God’s special favor toward all members of His Covenant whether elect or reprobate.

It is this last form of common grace which brings us to the genuine offer of the Gospel. God shows special favor to all those who are brought near to His saving grace. While Murray probably had non-elect professing believers in mind, there’s no reason why those who are reached by evangelists would not be seen as receiving this type of common grace. At the very least, they would occupy a position somewhere between the second and third classification.

This is true.

John Calvin taught it.

Charles Hodge taught it.

John Murray taught it.

I was taught this in seminary.

Oh, not that this matters much to some traditionalists, but the Apostle Paul taught this as well.

Up until real recently the only “Reformed” who had a problem with this were some hypercalvinists up in Michigan and the disciples of Gordon Clark.  Times have changed, slipped sideways, and torn a hole in the space-time continuum landing us all in some sort of nightmarish bizarro world.

POSTSCRIPT: Jeff writes about this!

Despite the defense of John Murray and others, there are Reformed thinkers who would contend that they can deny any such “disposition” to God (of love toward the reprobate) without being guilty of “desperate exegetical violence.” Perhaps the most well-known of those who would deny Murray’s exegetical conclusion are Herman Hoeksema and David Engelsma But these authors, in their books on the subject, do not deal with the exegesis.Hoeksema does not even mention Luke 6.35, 36 in his magnum opus, Reformed Dogmatics.[Grand Rapids, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Assoc., 1966] Furthermore, his “discussion” of Matthew 5.44, 45 is rather trite [p. 106-107]. Having surveyed other passages of Scripture, Hoeksema develops a definition of love which dictates that it “can exist only in the sphere of ethical perfection. It requires an ethically perfect subject as well as an ethically perfect object.” Having developed this definition, he then “in passing, remarks” that the sort of love to which Jesus refers in Matthew 5.44 must refer to a substandard “onesided” sort of love. But why was not this verse included in the passages which contributed to Hoeksema’s definition of love? Why is it only worthy of a “passing” and dismissive “remark” after a definition which excluded it from consideration has already been decided upon? Hoeksema gives us here a case study in arbitrary theology, in which the conclusions are known well in advance of the investigation.

It is this assertion that love requires perfection which Hoeksema invoked in a much earlier and now less-well-known work to defuse the import of Matthew 5.44-45. According to Hoeksema, to use the text to prove common grace “proves too much” and “leads to absurdity.” It proves too much because “all the Scriptures witness that God does not love, but hates his enemies and purposes to destroy them.” It leads to absurdity because “if rain and sunshine are a manifestation of love for all men, the just and the unjust, what are floods and droughts, pestilences and earthquakes and all destructive forces and evils sent to all through nature, but manifestations of His hatred for all, the just and the unjust?”[The Protestant Reformed Churches in America: Their Origin, Early History, and Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: no pub., 1936), p. 317.]

Finally, Hoeksema demonstrates the desperate exegetical violence which Murray mentions: “Besides, it must not be overlooked that the text does not at all state that God is gracious to the just and to the unjust, but that He rains and causes His sun to shine on all.” [Ibid, p. 318.]

What are we to say to all this? First of all, the plain meaning of Jesus’ words is that the natural blessings brought through God’s providence represent His love. Hoeksema has done nothing to disprove this obvious fact.

Second, it is well worth asking how we are to interpret the destructive forces of nature, but such a question cannot reduce the plain meaning of Jesus’ words to absurdity, unless God can be guilty of absurdity, which is blasphemous to contemplate. Perhaps we need to ask if we have not created more trouble than necessary by absolutizing the distinction between God’s “Fatherly displeasure” and His “wrath,” between “discipline” and “chastisement” on the one hand, and “punishment” on the other. As Louis Berkhof asks rhetorically: “Are the elect in this life the objects of God’s love only, and never in any sense the objects of His wrath? Is Moses thinking of the reprobate when he says: ‘For we are consumed in thine anger, and in thy wrath we are troubled’? Psa 90.7.”[Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1941), p. 445.] It is a profound truth and great comfort that all things, including sufferings, work ultimately to our good as Christians. The question is whether that fact necessitates that all things are alike and in the same way to be considered “good” simply because of the future result in glory.

Third, Murray does not deny the doctrine of reprobation, that God purposes to destroy some of His enemies, those whom He does not reconcile to Himself. Murray, like those Hoeksema is attacking, believes that common grace is compatible with reprobation. To say that a passage that seems to teach common grace simply cannot do so because other passages clearly teach reprobation, is to fundamentally beg the question. Hoeksema needs to demonstrate this contradiction, not simply assume it as the basis of his argument.

David Engelsma only mentions Matthew 5.44-48 once in his defense of Hoeksema from the charge of “hyper-calvinism.” Of Murray’s and Stonehouse’s booklet on “The Free Offer of the Gospel” he writes:

But where do they begin when they look for Biblical support for this doctrine? Matthew 5.44-48! a passage which they themselves admit “does not indeed deal with the overtures of grace in the gospel . . . . The particular aspect of God’s grace reflected upon here is the common gifts of providence, the making of the sun to rise upon evil and good . . . .” Nevertheless, this “common grace” in things temporal is made the foundation and source of the doctrine of a grace of God that desires salvation and that operates in the preaching: in the common grace of God “is disclosed to us a principle that applies to all manifestations of divine grace, namely, that the grace bestowed expresses the lovingkindness in the heart of God . . . .” [Hyper-Calvinism & the Call of the Gospel (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Assoc., 1980), p. 112.]

Yet, after strongly denying that Matthew 5.44-48 has anything to do with the genuine offer of the Gospel, on the very next page Engelsma writes:

Men simply cannot escape the overpowering testimony of Scripture that the grace of God is one, not two, and that this grace is the glorious favor of God towards damnworthy sinners that wills their deliverance from sin and death, provides redemption for them in the cross of the Beloved, and manifests itself in the gospel. If, then, there is a grace of God for all, men must conclude that the grace of God in Christ Jesus is for all. . . The only safeguard against universal, saving grace is the complete repudiation of Kuyperian common grace.

Now Engelsma is, as far as I can tell, making some gross exaggerations in merging universalism, with hypothetical universalism, with the sincere offer of the Gospel, with common grace, but, at the very least, this statement strongly supports the use of Matthew 5.44, 45 to defend the genuine offer of the Gospel! If Engelsma is even partly right (and he is only partly right), then it makes perfect sense to cite God’s disposition of love toward the reprobate as evidence that this disposition motivates the offer of the Gospel. Yet Engelsma never bothers to explain where Murray made his mistake. He simply goes on to argue against common grace and the sincere offer of the Gospel without ever again mentioning Matthew 5.44, 45. He avoids “desperate exegetical violence” by simply avoiding exegesis altogether.