One of the things that keeps me from blogging all that often is that I don’t do my reading in my office. So, I often think of things I would like to think in print about, but, since I am only remembering the souce text, I want to hold off until I have the book in front of me at the keyboard. And, more often than not, that never happens. In reality I would be much more likely to reach that point if I blog a reminder to myself.
So what follows are my reflections on remembered impressions. If I make this sort of thing a habit I’ll probably link this entry just for its provisio’s Or else I’ll copy it as a permanant preface to all such blogs. Accuracy is desired here but inaccuracy is risked.
I thought Turretin tore into Amyraut’s “four-pointer” scheme rather well. He is convincing. He makes you think that Amyraut is really wrong.
But when he begins defending infralapsarianism his entire case suddenly seems arbitrary. If God can have amnesia as to why he is decreeing the fall into sin, then why not when he decrees the death of the Son? As far as I can tell, Turretin’s thinking on Amyraldianism is quite cogent. He should have followed through with his principles and favored supralapsarianism.
Of course, supralapsarianism only explains God’s plan to a point. I can’t imagine knowing anything about God if we can’t ascribe teleological reasoning to him (i.e. God sent his Son to save me from my sins), but teleology cannot be exhaustive. Any final end point we postulate as what God wanted is always somewhat contrived because time will go on forever and forever has no final end point.
But still, it must be true that God sent his son for a reason and that he ordained the fall for a reason.
So.. is that the telos of the Incarnation?
Steve, I’m not undestanding your question.
I was just being pushy, and trying to get you to elaborate on the reason for Christ’s incarnation, and perhaps a non-felix culpa
Oh Mark you are killing me here, it was a horrible response to Amyraut: full of strawman and irrevelant conclusions and bad exegesis.
David Ponter
Well, I’m working from memory. I do think that there may have been some problems (or not–I need to get my books out to figure this out for sure), but I still thought Turretin made some (he only needs one, right?) convincing disproofs.
But these were all jeapardized by his embracing of an order and his declaring for infralapsarianism.
(I don’t think I made it clear that my supra loyalties are somewhat hypothetical: “If there was an order that we can comprehend than *this* would be the best candidate”).
G’day Mark
About 8 months ago I went through his arguments against Amyraut in the two key loci (his lapsarian discussions and the call of the gospel section). I was amazed at the arguments he actually posited.
About 2 months ago I went through them again to work out Turretin’s assumptions regarding Amyraut. I did this because of Brian Armstrong’s work on Amyraut is very helpful.
What bothers me about Turretin’s polemic is that in order for it to work you have to have already bought into his bifurcations, like his Decreed (volitional) Revealed (mere approbative delight no volition) will distinction. One of Amyraut’s insights was that he realised that the simple decretive-revealed distinction does not do justice to the biblical data. The revealed will for God, said Amyraut, is volitional in some sense, it inclines and motivates God, inducing him to act, even to determine. Any reading of John 3:16 that rejects the notion that kosmos=elect, forces the theologian to arrive at something closer to Amyraut’s idea. Dabney got as close as he could with his “active principles” idea. Calvin was explicit. But Turretin was as far as he could be from Calvin or Dabney on this. (The nominalism inherent in Turretin’s view of divine willing is also operative here.)
The closest Turretin can get to ascribling ‘volition’ to the revealed will is in God’s will ad extra, in that he ‘desires’ compliance to his commands. But in terms of God’s will ad intra, the revealed will expresses nothing. All volition, ad intra is expressed exhaustively in the decretive will.
So given this, Turretin’s polemic against a ‘conditional decree’ only works on his terms. The idea of a conditional determination or intention of God, which is not absolute, naturally looks horrible. But if one is not working on Turretin’s assumptions, the “problem” is not there.
If that makes sense, thats one example Ive found with Turretins polemic.
OK, I ‘m officially advising you that if you leave comments that meaty you need to get your own blog.
What did you think of John Frame’s review of Armstrong’s book?
G’day Mark,
Well I have an in-principle disagreement with the concept of blogging. I am amazed that I am posting here. 🙂 Ive only done it once and by way of a request. I only read about 3 blogs: yours, YnottonY’s, and Soylent Green.
Thanks for the citation of Frame. Ive gone and read it.
What to say? Am I allowed to say it here? Do you mind?
In like Flynn: I am not into batting back and forth central dogma arguments from Muller, Trueman, and Nicole. They are only a little (read: smidgen) helpful, and as a tool.
Frame opens up with a great remark in commenting on what he calls ‘4 point Calvinism.’ He says: “that Christ atoned in some sense for the sins of every human being.’p186.
Aside from rejecting the label 4 point Calvinism as misleading, I can easily cite C Hodge, Dabney and Shedd saying just that, that Christ’s death was in some sense, a satisfaction, an expiation, which expiated (Shedd), for all men’s sins. Does that make them 4 pointers?
Frame later cites Nicole as saying that for Amyraut ‘thought that the only purpose of the atonement was to make salvation possible for all men,’p191. Thats simply not true. Armstrong expresses strong disattisfaction with this mis-comment, and I feel his pain as well.
Re: Calvin:
The problem is that everyone wants to treat Calvin as theological paradigm, and what he should have and ought to have said, rather than treating him as text. His writings should be treated with the same text-based hemeneutics we use for any other document. Nicole’s treatment of Calvin solidly hinge on his own theolical constructions (arguments) which are not actually derived from Calvin. He imposes them upon Calvin and then argues accordingly.
Ive written an intro paper where I document some of this.
The concept of hypothetical covenant is very interesting, not because of the idea, but because of the language. I am trying to trace the use of the language such as Christ died for all, *in case* (or *if*) they believe…” I am beginning to think that this hypothetical language was previous to Amyraut in first coined by men trying to synthesise the universal language of Scripture, as held by older Augustinianians, and the new emergent particularism generated by lapsarianism and tri-covenantal Federalism (of the late 16thC). I now suspect that it was not Amyraut who invented the theological use of “hypothetical” as an explanatory tool in these issues. And certainly, no one needs it. Calvin, Shedd, Dabney could easily say Christ made a vicarious expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world without recoursing to hypotheticalism at all: not even a hint.
Re: lapsarianism:
The whole enterprise is awful. Its the Protestant Scholastic equivalent of Thomas Aquinas’s “First Cause” which he used as the organising principle for his summa and its conclusions. Lapsarianism does for the Scholastics what “First Cause” did for Thomas. The whole idea of attempting to map out a monist teleology in linear fashion is terrible. Its reductionism: the last in action is the first in thought. This is true whether Ramist or not.
Anyway, I dont know if you allow extended comments like this or want them. Ill shut up now and return to lurk mode.
Thanks for the reference to Frame.
Take care,
David
I’m going to drop this for a later date when I have time and sources….
But I’m afraid you’re going to have to remove Soylent Green and the Blue Raja from your blog feed. It is a sad thing.
And it leaves a vacancy in the blogosphere…. 😉